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Corruption charges. Corruption? Corruption ain't nothing more
than government intrusion into market efficiencies in the form of
regulation. That's Milton Friedman. He got a goddam Nobel
Prize. We have laws against it precisely so we can get away with
it. Corruption is our protection. Corruption is what keeps us safe
and warm. Corruption is why you and I are here in the white-hot
center of things instead of fighting for scraps of meat out there
in the streets. Corruption is how we win.
-Danny Davis, director of a U.S. oil and gas firm in the film
Syriana, reacting to charges arising from his involvement in
securing oil field concessions in Kazakhstan
For every Danny Davis-or James Giffen, the real life "oil con-
sigliere" on whom Davis was based-there are scores of multinational
corporations that comply with the law.2 Although many commentators
may find it unsurprising that some multinational firms vigorously pursue
corruptly influenced contracts-or are at least complacent in accepting
such contracts3--another view holds that such an account is too cynical.
4
These optimists claim that corruption is inefficient and argue that moral
signals from the countries that have prohibited corruption by statute can
1. SYRIANA (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005), available at http://pdl.warnerbros.com/
wbmovies/syriana/site/med/Syriana-Screenplay.pdf.
2. See ROBERT BAER, SEE No EVIL: THE TRUE STORY OF A GROUND SOLDIER IN THE
CIA's WAR ON TERRORISM (2002); see also Pamela Karten Bookman, Solving the Extraterrito-
riality Problem: Lessons from the Honest Service Statute, 92 VA. L. REV. 749, 754-72 (2006)
(detailing Giffen's activities and arrest for violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA)); Joshua Chaffin, US Businessman Charged Over Mobil Oil Deal, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2003, at 1.
3. See, e.g., Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector is Likely to
Lead the Next Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 43
(2006); Paul D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln's Law
Abroad, 70 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 121, 127-29 (2007); Philip Segal, Coming Clean
on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18
FLA. J. INT'L L. 169 (2006) (claiming that levels of international bribery are likely much
higher than FCPA investigations indicate); Keeping A Close Watch, Bus. & FIN. (Ire.), Aug.
10, 2006, available at http://docs.newsbank.com/slInfoWeb/aggdocs/AWNB/I 1390FCB5CB
CBC38/ODIA2AB84F2D3D40; Reena SenGupta, Trouble at Home for Overseas Bribes, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at 12.
4. Jos6 Armando Fanjul, Comment, Corporate Corruption in Latin America: Accep-
tance, Bribery, Compliance, Denial, Economics, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 735, 758 (2008); see Roger C. Cramton, Counseling Organiza-
tional Clients "Within the Bounds of the Law," 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1043, 1058 (2006);
The FCPA Blog: News and Views About the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
That's Milton Friedman? (Aug. 22, 2008), http://fcpablog.blogspot.comI2008/08/thats-
milton-friedman.html.
5. See, e.g., Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corrup-
tion, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2006, at 75-76.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
also motivate firms.6 Under such a view, most multinational corporations
should endeavor to comply with the law.7
A recent, dramatic increase in prosecutions under the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA),8 however, may call into question whether
most companies seeking government contracts overseas are, in fact,
good corporate citizens. Against this backdrop of a rise in foreign brib-
ery prosecutions in the United States, the global community is also
taking an increased interest in criminalizing and prosecuting both do-
mestic and foreign bribery. While many States have passed legislation to
combat bribery pursuant to international agreements, an increase in for-
eign bribery enforcement need not be predicated on underlying statutory
changes. The United States provides one such example. Although com-
mentators disagree as to what factors have driven the expansion in
foreign bribery enforcement, 9 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) has demonstrated that, regardless of the underlying cause
of the increase, it clearly retains broad prosecutorial power and discre-
tion in FCPA enforcement against both domestic and foreign
corporations.
As the number of countries with statutes penalizing foreign bribery
increases, and as those statutes often include provisions conferring extra-
territorial jurisdiction, corporate officers increasingly face the risk of
multiple sovereigns seeking penalties based on the same alleged corpo-
rate wrongdoing. In the United States, many questions regarding the
FCPA remain unanswered due to the statute's vague language '° as well as
a lack of judicial review resulting from irregular enforcement and an en-
forcement strategy focused on inducing settlements."
6. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 3, at 120 (taking a skeptical view of business but
conceding that "such laws [as the FCPA] imply a moral judgment, and businessmen are not
immune to moral suasion").
7. Id.
8. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff (2000)),
amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(l)-(3), 78ff (2000)), and International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff (2000)).
9. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International
Bribery and Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67,
89 n.161 (2001); Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to
Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 195 (1994); Jennifer Dawn Taylor,
Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption, 61
LA. L. REV. 861, 871 (2001).
11. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NoRMs 6 (2005).
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Cause for particular concern is the SEC's increasing use of the rem-
edy of disgorgement of profits in FCPA settlements. Disgorgement, a
penalty through which the SEC requires a corporation to forfeit any prof-
its arising from illegal activity, has long been a remedy in the SEC's
more typical securities fraud actions. However, the SEC's importation of
disgorgement into the FCPA context in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX),' 2 despite the fact that Congress did not explicitly consider the
increased use of the remedy for foreign bribery, raises significant ques-
tions.
Consider, for example, the case of Titan Corp., a San Diego-based
defense contractor. Titan Corp.'s bribery charges arose from its payments
of more than $3.5 million to an intermediary in Benin for "consulting
services," through which Titan Corp. then funneled more than $2 million
of those monies into Benin's presidential election to support then-
President Mathieu Kr6kou. 3 Titan Corp. was seeking to curry favor
with Benin's government to assist the company in its development of a
telecommunications project in Benin and to obtain the Benin govern-
ment's consent to an increase in the percentage of Titan Corp.'s project
management fees for that project.' 4 In settling its FCPA liability with the
SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Titan Corp. agreed to
pay a then record-setting $28.5 million penalty, of which $15.5 million
represented disgorgement of profits and prejudgment interest. 5 Because
the disgorgement is agreed on through settlement, it is often impossible
to examine how the SEC calculates the profits that it will disgorge in an
individual case, but there are clearly extreme complexities and uncertain-
ties in calculating such disgorgement based on, for example, an attempt
to influence a foreign presidential election. Barring a smoking gun
memo obtained from the foreign government describing a quid pro quo,
how could the SEC ever prove that the payment of a certain amount re-
sulted in a specific benefit based on the influence or perceived influence
on a presidential election? What if President Krdkou had lost but Titan
Corp. had still received the contract? Instead, Kdr6kou won by more than
eighteen percent of the vote. 16 Does the expected value of the bribe
change depending on the closeness of the election? Should all Titan
Corp. contracts in Benin have incurred FCPA disgorgement liability as
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
13. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Titan Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 19,107, 84 SEC
Docket 3413 (Mar. 1, 2005).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1.
16. African Elections Database, Election in Benin, http://africanelections.tripod.com/
bj.html#2001._PresidentialElection (last visited Jan. 3, 2008).
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long as K6rkou remained president? Unlike the typical securities fraud
case, in which more certain disgorgement and profit calculations are pos-
sible,17 disgorgement is ill-suited to the foreign bribery context, in which
some disgorgement calculations must necessarily resemble speculation
or, at best, rough estimates.
This Note uses examples such as Titan Corp. to support the argu-
ment that there are reasons to question the United States' increasing
reliance on disgorgement to enforce the FCPA. Despite obvious deter-
rence benefits, the SEC's quest for disgorgement of ill-gotten gains
raises significant questions regarding extraterritoriality, proportionality,
and evidentiary uncertainty. This Note looks to the history of the FCPA
and both international anti-bribery agreements and foreign statutes im-
plementing those agreements in arguing that U.S. and foreign regulators
need to create a more certain, predictable enforcement climate as the
number of foreign bribery enforcement actions continue to explode. Part
I describes the FCPA, the U.S. statutory framework for combating for-
eign bribery, and details the international agreements that have become
critical to international enforcement of a ban on foreign bribery in the
preceding decade. Part II acknowledges the DOJ's and the SEC's in-
creasing enforcement of the FCPA. It argues that commentators have
failed to discuss one of the most marked changes in enforcement: the.
increasing importance of disgorgement in FCPA settlements. Indeed, this
Note claims that such disgorgement now exceeds penalties sought under
express, statutory fining authority. Part III emphasizes normative ques-
tions regarding such a shift in enforcement policy, arguing that neither
retributivist nor utilitarian theories underlying disgorgement justify the
kind of enforcement that is now occurring. It argues that, although the
SEC has statutory authority to seek such disgorgement, it is questionable
whether Congress foresaw the degree to which the SEC would empha-
size disgorgement in FCPA enforcement. Finally, it examines issues of
extraterritorial enforcement, proportionality, evidentiary difficulty, and
prosecutorial discretion in claiming that the FCPA is a unique and poten-
tially problematic context for disgorgement. It suggests that these
problems related to disgorgement have the potential to result in retarding
foreign direct investment in some emerging economies, rendering corpo-
rate growth more inefficient, and reducing effective competition.
17. One way, grossly simplified, to calculate disgorgement of profit is as follows: on
Date X, Investor A has inside information that she uses to purchase a stock; Investor A sells
the stock for a profit on Date Y; disgorgement from Investor A equals the difference of the
stock prices on Dates X and Y. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n v. Fischbach Corp., 133
F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1997); W. Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736,
742-43 (8th Cir. 1965).
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN
BRIBERY: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
In order to properly understand the role of disgorgement in the
prosecution of foreign bribery cases, a background in both the U.S.
statutory scheme and the international framework for criminalizing for-
eign bribery is necessary. Part L.A outlines the provisions of the FCPA
and the penalties that the DOJ and the SEC can seek under the Act. Part
II.B then describes the emerging international bribery norms and dis-
cusses the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions (OECD Convention) 8 and the U.N.
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)' 9 which, in turn, form the
backbone of many States' domestic anti-bribery legislation.
A. The U.S. Approach to the Bribing of Foreign Officials:
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
It was not until 1977, in the turmoil surrounding Watergate, that
Congress passed the FCPA as an amendment to the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act.2" While investigating Watergate and the related disclosures
of the early 1970s, Congress discovered multiple incidents of illegal
campaign contributions and money laundering through foreign coun-
• 21
tries. These discoveries led the SEC to initiate a voluntary disclosure
program for foreign bribery, which uncovered more than 450 companies
that had collectively made more than $300 million in questionable for-
eign payments." The FCPA's focus on the parties that provided the
payments-the supply-side actors of foreign bribery-was essentially
18. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17,
1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Con-
vention].
19. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/422, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/58/422/Annex (Oct. 7, 2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004) [hereinafter UNCAC].
20. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(l), (g)-(h), 78dd(l)-(3), 78ff (2000)),
amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(l)-(3), 78ff (2000)), and International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff (2000)).
21. See Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions,
50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 593, 595 (2002).
22. Id.; see also Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 509,
518 (1997) (claiming more than $400 million in questionable foreign payments).
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the first effort in the world to criminalize extraterritorial actions and for-
eign payments that large, multinational corporations paid to foreign
officials .23
Amended twice since its initial passage, the current FCPA is not
identical to the original legislation, 24 although it does largely rely on the
two-pronged approach to combat foreign corruption laid out in 1977.
This approach first criminalizes bribery of foreign officials and, second,
establishes accounting and record-keeping requirements. 2  The FCPA
bribery prohibition begins: "It shall be unlawful ... to ... corruptly in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization
giving anything of value. ' 26 The jurisdictional reach as to territory is ex-
plicitly universal, applying both to actions through the mail or other
means of interstate commerce in the United States,27 as well as to con-
duct that takes place exclusively in foreign countries without implicating
interstate commerce. The FCPA's record-keeping standards require,
23. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007). The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) report indicated that such household names as Boeing, Lockheed Martin,
and Gulf Oil had disclosed such payments. SEC, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May
12, 1976), reprinted in Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), No. 353 Special Supp. (May 19, 1976).
24. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(l), (g)-(h), 78dd(l)-(3), 78ff
(2000)), amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff (2000)), and
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat.
3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff (2000)).
25. Compare id., with International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff
(2000)). The bribery prohibition applies to "persons." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3). The record-
keeping requirements apply only to "issuers," id. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, which the FCPA does not
define. However, "it is clear from the usage that it refers to juridical persons or companies that
have a class of securities registered pursuant to the amended Securities and Exchange Act of
1934." Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International Law
in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 691, 701 (2007).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a). For these offers to be unlawful, they need to be, first, made
by an issuer or person; second, made to any "foreign official," "foreign political party or offi-
cial thereof," or "any person" if the offeror knows that any portion of the offer will end up
with a foreign official or foreign political party; third, made for the purpose of "influencing
any act or decision" of the foreign official in his official capacity, inducing any action in viola-
tion of "the lawful duty of such foreign official," inducing a person to use her influence to
affect an action from a foreign government, or "securing any improper advantage"; and, fi-
nally, made in an effort to assist in "obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person." Id. As to this general rule, the FCPA creates an exception for, inter
alia, "facilitating" payments. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b). A discussion of these "facilitating pay-
ments" is beyond the scope of this Note, and will not be addressed.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a).
28. See id. § 78dd-1(g).
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inter alia, that issuers maintain their records in a detailed, accurate man-
ner,29 and that issuers must maintain a "system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that" they will com-
ply with regulations covering accounting standards and authorizations
for expenditures. 0
In terms of enforcement, the DOJ and the SEC jointly prosecute the
FCPA, with the SEC focusing on civil violations related to issuers and
the DOJ concentrating on criminal violations.3 ' Historically, the SEC
engaged in civil enforcement of the accounting and record-keeping pro-
visions and was less active in enforcement of the bribery provisions,32
although this inactivity began to change in the late 1990S, 33 particularly
following the Enron scandal.34 The agencies often work together to bring
parallel criminal and civil proceedings against the same party." In inves-
tigations involving issuers over which both agencies have jurisdiction,
informal cooperation-rather than formal policy-determines the
agency that will actually conduct the investigation.6
In addition to the criminal penalties that the DOJ may bring against
a party,37 the SEC retains a great deal of discretion in deciding which
civil enforcement actions to bring against issuers as well as the appropri-
ate level and type of penalties-fines, injunctions, or both-to seek in an
action.3" The SEC will often follow a "zero tolerance" policy in the case
of companies that violate both the bribery and record-keeping provi-
sions, but it has shown more willingness to work with companies that
implement prompt and effective remedial measures.39 The SEC may also
obtain-and increasingly seeks--disgorgement of profits, which is dis-
cussed in detail below.0 Finally, the SEC is increasing its use of
settlements to resolve civil liabilities in conjunction with the DOJ's cor-
responding increased use of deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs)
29. Id. § 78m(b)(2).
30. Id. § 78m(2).
31. DEMING, supra note 11, at 41. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) also handles
civil enforcement not related to issuers. Id.
32. Id.
33. For a discussion of why the enforcement strategy may have changed, see infra notes
70-76 and accompanying text.
34. DEMING, supra note 11, at 41.
35. Id. at 42.
36. See Paul V. Gerlach & George B. Parizek, The SEC's Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, in 3 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER 14-1, 14-3 (West,
2d ed. 2008).
37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)-3(e), 78ff(a), 78ff(c)(l)(A)-(2)(A). Criminal fines can
also be significantly higher under alternative sentencing provisions, equaling twice the crimi-
nal's gross gain. See DEMING, supra note 11, at 43 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d)).
38. DEMING, supra note 11, at 44; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u, 78u-3.
39. DEMING, supra note 11, at 44.
40. See discussion infra Part i.A.
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and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), through which the DOJ and the
SEC obtain structural reform settlements as part of agreements not to
pursue civil penalties or criminal charges.4'
B. International Approaches to the Bribing of Foreign Officials
Although U.S. Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson called for
an international treaty on foreign bribery in 1976,42 the United States was
alone in administering an enforcement regime against such bribery
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.43 In 1988, however, a series of amend-
ments to the FCPA4 spawned renewed interest in foreign corruption and
bribery, and international activity on these fronts increased.4 ' For the
purposes of this Note, the two key agreements that have affected imple-
menting legislation criminalizing foreign bribery are the 1997 OECD
Convention46 and the UNCAC, which the States Parties adopted in 2003
and which entered into force in December 2005.47
The United States had pushed for the OECD Convention since the
passage of the FCPA in 1977, 4 a strategy vindicated by the powerful ef-
fect that the OECD Convention has had on foreign legislation
criminalizing foreign bribery. The OECD Convention broadly echoes the
prohibitions of the FCPA, requiring the domestic criminalization of
41. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 860,
886, 890 (2007).
42. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protec-
tion & Finance of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess., at 40,
46 (1976) (report of Richardson Task Force).
43. See Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A
Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 243, 245
(1998).
44. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988 (part of Omnibus Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988), Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988).
45. DEMING, supra note 11, at 93.
46. OECD Convention, supra note 18.
47. UNCAC, supra note 19. At the time that this Note went to press, 140 States had
signed the Convention, and 116 had ratified it. See U.N. Office on Drug & Crimes, United
Nations Convention Against Corruption, Signatories to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2009). Other international agreements on foreign bribery include regional
instruments by the Organization of American States and the African Union. See African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (2004);
Organization of American States [OAS], Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar.
29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).
48. From the calls for an international agreement on bribery in the 1970s, see supra
note 43 and accompanying text, to the 1988 statement by the U.S. Congress encouraging the
President to pursue such an agreement with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 5003(d), Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2000)), U.S. policymakers
have often stated such a goal. But, European resistance was more entrenched than political
will within any U.S. presidential administration. See Schroth, supra note 21, at 610.
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bribery, attempted bribery, or conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as
including accounting provisions similar to those in the FCPA. 9 The
OECD Convention also lays out broad requirements of domestic imple-
menting legislation, which include that "bribery of a foreign public
official shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive
criminal penalties."50 Each implementing State must also "take such
measures as may be necessary to provide that the bribe and the proceeds
of the bribery of a foreign official, or property the value of which corre-
sponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and confiscation
or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are applicable."5'
Whether and how retribution and deterrence goals for this international
bribery regime are actually reached is a difficult question, however, be-
cause the OECD Convention requires implementing legislation, which
52OECD Member States have only recently begun to pass.
The increasing coalescence around agreements criminalizing foreign
bribery contributed to the enactment of the most comprehensive corrup-
tion treaty in the world: the UNCAC."3 The UNCAC specifically, and in
detail, addresses private sector transnational bribery. It requires each
State Party to adopt legislation criminalizing the intentional offering or
giving of a bribe to both national and foreign public officials as well as
the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe by a national official.54 The
UNCAC also provides more detail as to punishment and enforcement
than any of the other international corruption and bribery instruments,
including requirements as to domestic enforcement and international
49. OECD Convention, supra note 18, art. 8.
50. Id. art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added).
51. Id. art. 3, para. 3 (emphasis added). The official Commentaries clarify paragraph
three of Article 3 in the following way:
21. The "proceeds" of bribery are the profits or other benefits derived by the briber
from the transaction or other improper advantage obtained or retained through brib-
ery.
22. The term "confiscation" includes forfeiture where applicable and means the
permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority.
This paragraph is without prejudice to the rights of victims.
OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97) 20, at 9 (Nov. 21,
1997).
52. See, e.g., Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1998 S.C., ch. 34 (Can.); see
also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Value and Interests: International Legalization in
the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 143-44 (2002); infra Part II.B.
53. Kenneth B. Reisenfeld, Policy on Convention Against Corruption, 2005 A.B.A.
SEC. INT'L L. REP. 2 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/policy/crime
extradition/conventioncorruption08-05.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
54. See UNCAC, supra note 19, arts. 15-16.
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cooperation." The Convention requires that each State Party, "to the
greatest extent possible," take measures to achieve disgorgement of the
profits from illegal bribery and other forms of corruption 6 While the
UNCAC requires international cooperation "as appropriate,5 7 it essen-
tially approves of universal jurisdiction for each State Party over
offences that are covered by that party's domestic law.5"
II. THE EVOLVING ENFORCEMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY
While any U.S. statute may be subject to occasional waxing and
waning enforcement, the recent changes in FCPA enforcement are quan-
tifiable and significant. The changes represent a dramatic shift in the way
in which the DOJ and the SEC enforce the FCPA. In addition, the
changes in foreign statutes and foreign enforcement have occurred si-
multaneously with the shift in U.S. enforcement. When considered
alongside the SEC's increased enforcement,59 these foreign actions raise
important questions about the goals and structure of a patchwork of na-
tional statutes and international agreements meant to combat the same
conduct: international bribery.
Part II.A argues that the SEC's pursuit of disgorgement in FCPA
prosecutions represents a fundamental shift in U.S. enforcement policy.
Part II.B then details an under-documented issue in foreign bribery en-
forcement:60 foreign implementing legislation and the even more recent
foreign enforcement actions that have arisen under those statutes, and
without which the foreign statutes would be ineffective. It claims that,
while foreign enforcement is in its relative infancy, the recent growth in
the number of these actions is a trend that will continue and that may
61
eventually create a risk of redundant enforcement.
55. Snider & Kidane, supra note 25, at 706-07, 709.
56. It defines such proceeds as, "(a) [p]roceeds of crime derived from offences estab-
lished in accordance with this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that
of such proceeds; (b) [p]roperty, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for
use in offences established in accordance with this Convention." UNCAC, supra note 19, art.
31(1). The provisions covering domestic enforcement also address prosecutorial discretion,
requiring that prosecutions "take into account the gravity of that offence." Id. art. 30(1); see
also id. art. 31(3).
57. See id. art. 42(5)-(6).
58. Id. art. 42(7).
59. See discussion infra Part HA.
60. See, e.g., Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2008).
61. Burger & Holland, supra note 3, at 52.
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A. The Unprecedented Enforcement of the FCPA and the
SEC's Increased Efforts to Disgorge
The level of FCPA enforcement has increased significantly in recent
years. Traditionally both the DOJ and the SEC engaged in minimal en-
forcement of the FCPA.62 Indeed, from 1978 to 2000, the SEC and the
DOJ averaged approximately three FCPA prosecutions per year,63 and the
rare case that went to trial typically resulted in minimal penalties. 64 The
average number of investigations for 2003 to 2009, however, was ap-
proximately twenty per year and trending upwards.65 Furthermore, the
enforcement climate was characterized by a "frenetic pace" of enforce-
ment.66 In addition to an increase in the number of FCPA investigations,
the typical form of resolution has also changed. Across all DOJ investi-
gations-not just those under the FCPA-the number of settlements
between defendants and the DOJ has grown substantially since 2002.67
These settlements are typically memorialized as non-prosecution agree-
ments or deferred prosecution agreements, depending on whether the
DOJ is permanently agreeing not to prosecute or is doing so contingent
on future good behavior. From 2002 through 2005 the number of NPAs
and DPAs exceeded the total number that the DOJ entered into in the ten
years previous, 6' and FCPA enforcement has been no exception.69
62. Id. at 44.
63. See Huskins, supra note 60, at 1449 (citing Eugene R. Erbstoesser, John H. Struc &
John W.E Chesley, The FCPA and Analogous Foreign Anti-Bribery Laws-Overview, Recent
Developments, and Acquisition Due Diligence, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 381, 386 (2007)).
64. Id. Commentators noted the lack of enforcement during this period. See, e.g., Car-
rington, supra note 3, at 116.
65. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN FCPA EN-
FORCEMENT (as of February 13, 2008) 2 (2008), http://www.shearman.comfiles/upload/
FCPA_Trends.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter SHEARMAN & STERLING FCPA
TRENDS 2008]. In addition, the level of notices and publications from law firms regarding
FCPA compliance was exceptionally high during 2007 and 2008. See, e.g., Timothy L. Dick-
inson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Implementing a Compliance Program in the Real
World, 1665 PRACTISING L. INST. 249 (2008); Colleen P. Mahoney, Foreign Private Issuers
and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1601 PRACTISING L. INsT. 773 (2007).
66. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update, (July 07, 2008),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter
Gibson, Dunn 2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update]; SHEARMAN & STERLING FCPA TRENDS 2008,
supra note 65, at 2; see also Bookman, supra note 2, at 753.
67. See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The De-
partment of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 1-3 (2006).
68. Id. Since 2002, the total number of these agreements that the DOJ has entered into
has continued to increase. See Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1435-36 (2007).
69. See DANFORTH NEWCOMB & PHILIP UROFSKY, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA
DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UN-
DER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 (as of February 13, 2008) 2 (2008),
available at http://www.shearman.con/iles/upload/FCPA-Digest.pdf. The DOJ and the SEC
have also increasingly relied on corporate monitors as a term of non-prosecution agreements
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While no detailed, quantitative study has attempted to explain the
reasons for the increase in FCPA enforcement, a number of commenta-
tors have pointed to various factors, although it is likely that the reason
for the rise in enforcement is a combination of statutory, political, and
international events. Some observers claim that the increase in FCPA
enforcement was triggered by the scandals surrounding Enron and
WorldCom in 2001 and 2002, which did not involve foreign bribery but
increased government scrutiny of corporate behavior in general. 7° A re-
lated view focuses on the corporations' self-reporting, claiming that,
particularly in the wake of increased government scrutiny of corporate
accounting following the passage of SOX,7' firms have brought viola-
tions to the attention of the DOJ and the SEC in the hope that such
conduct will gain leniency from regulators.72 Under this view, SOX and
the heightened awareness of compliance and penalties for non-
compliance have motivated corporations to make voluntary disclosures.
A second explanation of increased enforcement claims that the commis-
sioners and professional staff of the modern SEC simply emphasize
different enforcement priorities and are willing to settle cases as part of
DPAs. That is, "the SEC is a very different agency today than it was even
in the recent past.' 73 A related, partial explanation is that enforcement
resources have increased.74 A third potential reason for increased en-
forcement is the DOJ's and the SEC's increased self-awareness of
prosecutorial goals, directives, and policy in the wake of recent DOJ
memoranda regarding factors to be weighed in deciding whether to
charge corporations with criminal acts.75 Finally, a potential fourth factor
(NPAs) or deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) to ensure ongoing compliance. See Vik-
ramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate
Czar, 105 MIcH. L. REv. 1713 (2007).
70. See, e.g., DEMING, supra note 11, at 41.
71. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
72. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/mcnulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo]; Huskins, supra
note 60, at 1449.
73. Gregory S. Bruch, A.B.A. Ctr. for Continuing Legal Educ., Nat'l Inst., Recent SEC
Foreign Payment Cases and the Road Ahead Under the New SEC Leadership (Mar. 21-22,
2002).
74. See William F. Pendergast & Nisa Gosselink-Ulep, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
Walker LLP, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2008: Coping with Heightened Enforcement
Risks, 1665 PRACrISING L. INST. 113, 156 (2008).
75. See generally Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 69 (discussing the increased use of
corporate monitors). One such memorandum, "Federal Prosecution of Corporations," which
subsequently became known as the "Holder Memo," set out eight factors for federal prosecu-
tors to consider in deciding whether to bring a case against a corporation. Memorandum from
Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S.
Att'ys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/
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is that the global community's acceptance of international agreements
against bribery has enabled increased aggressiveness on the part of U.S.
enforcement agencies for reasons of both cultural sensitivity and coop-
eration.76
These changes in the enforcement environment have brought about
not only a marked increase in prosecutions, but also a corresponding in-
crease in the value of settlements arising from FCPA violations. Part of
the increase arises simply from the larger number of FCPA investiga-
tions, 77 but the average penalty in each case is also increasing,7  with
penalties in many recent cases reaching tens of millions of dollars.79
The SEC's increasing activity on the anti-bribery front and the
SEC's rapidly expanding use of the remedy of disgorgement of profits
are significant factors in this trend. In the FCPA's first decade, the SEC
initiated only three anti-bribery cases under the Act.80 During this period,
the SEC typically focused on the accounting and record-keeping provi-
sions of the Act, not seeking disgorgement of profits, and leaving
enforcement of anti-bribery provisions to the DOJ.' Although the SEC's
minimal enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA began
to change toward the end of the 1990s, 82 it was not until 2004 that the
SEC first required disgorgement of profits as a result of the payment of a
bribe. 3 That "the practice appears to have become standardforeign  ht"h cieapas v oesadr
1999/chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memo]; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 69, at
1719. The "Thompson Memo," the "McNulty Memo," and the "Filip Memo" have updated the
Holder Memo, supporting the idea that increased self-awareness of decisions to prosecute
corporations may be a factor in the increased level of prosecution. See McNulty Memo, supra
note 72; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Department Components and U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo];
Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Principles of Fed-
eral Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memo].
76. See, e.g., Thomas McVey & Carole Basri, International Business Risks Increase,
N.Y. L.J., May 10, 1999, at S3. In support of this theory is the claim of Peter Clark, former
Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section of the DOJ, that the OECD's language on international
cooperation would result in a "new era of prosecution." Id.
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78. See NEWCOMB & UROFSKY, supra note 69, at 5.
79. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
80. See Huskins, supra note 60, at 1449.
81. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
82. See DEMING, supra note 11, at 41.
83. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2006 Year-End FCPA Update, (Feb. 7, 2007),
http://www.gibsondunn.comlpublications/pages/2006YearEndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter
Gibson, Dunn 2006 Year-End FCPA Update]; see also JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY
HUSAIN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 49-57 (1997) (detailing enforcement under
the FCPA but neglecting to discuss disgorgement).
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fare ''8 has greatly contributed to the marked increase in total penalties in
FCPA enforcement cases.
The SEC can support its pursuit of disgorgement under broad equi-
table principles or statutory authorization. Disgorgement is an equitable
concept that has existed in Exchange Act jurisprudence for decades. The
first case using the word "disgorgement" for violations of Rule lOb-5
stated: "[I]t is simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his
fraudulent enrichment.' 85 While disgorgement can serve deterrence pur-
poses, it is intended not to compensate the wronged party or to serve as a
complete stand-in for the deterrent effects of fining, but to recover the
benefits of a wrongful act.86 Although a longstanding equitable tool, dis-
gorgement was used relatively sparingly by the SEC until the passage of
SOX, which is also, now, a part of the Exchange Act. 87 In addition, the
SEC is statutorily authorized to seek disgorgement of ill-gotten gains
84. Gibson, Dunn 2006 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 83. This trend has been
noticed but not discussed by commentators. See, e.g., Krever, supra note 23, at 96. The num-
ber of academic articles that mention FCPA disgorgement without any discussion is revealing.
See John Hatchard, Recent Developments in Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials: A Cause for Optimism?, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 27 (2007); Huskins, supra note
60, at 1449; Justice and SEC Settle Cases Involving U.S. and Foreign Corporate Kickbacks
Under UN Oil-for-Food Program, 102 Am. J. INT'L L. 352 (2008); Mike Koehler, A Malady in
Search of a Cure-The Increase in FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Health-Care Compa-
nies, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 261, 280 (2008); Mike Koehler, The Unique FCPA Compliance
Challenges of Doing Business in China, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J. 397, 414 (2007); Krever, supra
note 23, at 95; Ned Sebelius, Twenty-Third Survey of White Collar Crime, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 579, 598 (2008); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulat-
ing the "New Regulators": Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 159, app. (2008). But see James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Pro-
posal for Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 Bus. LAW. 1233,
1237 n.13 (2007) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2000)). While some publications of the defense
bar have given slightly more attention to disgorgement, as recently as 2007, they failed to
discuss the degree to which the use of disgorgement has increased, the propriety of the pun-
ishment, and how such disgorgement fits into an increasingly internationalized foreign bribery
enforcement regime. See, e.g., Edward J. Fishman & Jeffrey B. Maletta, K&L Gates, FCPA En-
forcement Activity and Severity of Penalties Relating to Business Activities in China Likely to
Increase Dramatically As Global Trade with China Surges to Record Levels (Feb. 2007),
http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/Detail.aspx?publication=3580 (last visited Feb. 20, 2009);
Gibson, Dunn 2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update, supra note 66; Gibson, Dunn 2006 Year-End FCPA
Update, supra note 83; Nina Gross & Edward Rial, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2008:
Coping with Heightened Enforcement Risks, 1665 PRACTISING L. INsT. 309, 312 (2008); NEW-
COMB & UROFSKY, supra note 69, at 5-6, 10; William Pendergast, Matthew R. Fowler & Jennifer
D. Riddle, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, Some Comments About Recent and Future
FCPA Enforcement, 1588 PRACTISING L. INST. 165, 177 (2007); Pendergast & Gosselink-
Ulep, supra note 74; SHEARMAN & STERLING FCPA TRENDS 2008, supra note 65, at 5, 10.
85. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (citations omitted).
86. See Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F2d 90,
102 (2d Cir. 1978).
87. Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Damages and
Remedial Offers, 63 Bus. LAW. 347 (2008).
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pursuant to the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,88 although, in practice,
the FCPA has recently been the statute that the SEC typically invokes
when it seeks to disgorge profits. Because the SEC's enforcement of the
FCPA derives from the fact that the record-keeping prong of that statute
amended the Exchange Act, 9 the SEC has used the full range of reme-
dies available in securities actions in enforcing the FCPA despite the fact
that Congress explicitly provided for fining remedies in the FCPA itself.
As one commentator noted, "The propriety and legality of this remedy
have not been tested in the courts "'9
While the SEC eschewed disgorgement of profits for the first
twenty-seven years of FCPA enforcement, it has garnered an impressive
list of disgorgement in the last five years. After first disgorging the prof-
its of a corporation charged with foreign bribery in 2004,9' the SEC
quickly ramped up this form of enforcement in March 2005 with its ac-
tion, discussed above, against Titan Corp.92 The years 2006 and 2007 saw
record-setting enforcement actions and penalties garnered by the SEC,
and 2007 was the first year in which disgorgement actually eclipsed all
other types of penalties against corporations for violations of the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA.93 In 2008, disgorgement continued to be
88. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, §§ 202(a), 203, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e)
(2000)).
89. DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2-2
(2006).
90. See Doty, supra note 84, at 1235 n.13.
91. In 2004, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc., agreed to $5.9 million in disgorgement and pre-
judgment interest-in a total $16.4 million settlement-as part of a DPA. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. ABB Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 18,775, 83 SEC Docket 849 (July 6, 2004).
92. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. In addition to Titan Corp., in 2005,
Diagnostics Products Corp. agreed to approximately $2.8 million in disgorgement as part of a
$4.8 million DPA settlement, In re Diagnostic Prods. Corp., SEC Administrative Proceeding
File No. 3-11933 (May 20, 2005), and DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. agreed to $2.8 million in dis-
gorgement as part of a $4.8 million DPA settlement, NEWCOMB & UROFSKY, supra note 69, at
42.
93. In 2006, the SEC increased the number of disgorgement enforcement actions by
sixty percent. In that year, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., agreed to $7.7 million in disgorge-
ment as part of a $15.2 million DPA settlement, In re Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., SEC
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-12456 (Oct. 16, 2006), and Statoil ASA agreed to $10.5
million in disgorgement as part of a $21 million DPA settlement. Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, SEC Sanctions Statoil for Bribes to Iranian Government Official (Oct. 13,
2006). The SEC more than doubled the number of enforcement actions in 2007. See Gibson,
Dunn 2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update, supra note 66. In a settlement that eclipsed the value of
the Titan settlement, Baker Hughes Inc. agreed to $23 million in disgorgement as part of a
NPA settlement of more than $44 million arising out of its illegal payments to two agents in
efforts to win oil field contracts in Kazakhstan and other countries. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v.
Baker Hughes Inc. & Roy Feamley, SEC Litigation Release No. 20,094, 90 SEC Docket 1369
(Apr. 26, 2007). Other large disgorgement payments arose from illegal payments made in
relation to the U.N. Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chevron
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the dominant form of SEC penalty for FCPA violations, as the SEC shat-
tered all previous penalty levels, enforcing more than $381 million in
disgorgement. 4 This exponential increase in disgorgement was due
largely to Siemens AG's agreement to pay more than $800 million in
U.S. penalties-part of the more than $1.6 billion worldwide settle-
ment-to close an investigation arising from its "unprecedented" failure
to supervise its officers and employees at many levels and throughout the
world.9 While Siemens is a new high-water mark and a clear outlier
from previous settlements-indeed it eclipses all other FCPA settlements
in history, combined-it is likely that settlements similarly dwarfing the
pre-Siemens record will arise in the near future.96 These SEC settlements
of FCPA cases leave no doubt that disgorgement of profits is a new and
critical trend in the U.S. foreign bribery enforcement regime.9
Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 20,363, 91 SEC Docket 2696 (Nov. 14, 2007) (Chevron's
agreement to $25 million in disgorgement as part of a total $30 million DPA settlement); Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n v. El Paso Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 19,991, 89 SEC Docket 3020
(Feb. 7, 2007) (El Paso Corp.'s agreement to approximately $5.5 million in disgorgement as
part of a total NPA settlement of more than $7.7 million); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. York Int'l
Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 20319, 91 SEC Docket 2139 (Oct. 1, 2007) (York Interna-
tional's agreement to $10 million in disgorgement as a part of a total $22 million DPA
settlement).
94. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Fiat S.P.A. & CNH Global N.V., SEC Litigation
Release No. 20,835 (Dec. 22, 2008) (Fiat S.p.A. and CNH Global N.V. agreed to approxi-
mately $7.2 million in disgorgement as part of a total DPA settlement of approximately $17.8
million); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Siemens AG, SEC Litigation Release No. 20,829 (Dec. 15,
2008) (Siemens AG agreed to approximately $350 million in disgorgement as part of a total
U.S. settlement of approximately $800 million); In re Faro Techs., Inc., SEC Administrative
Proceeding File No. 3-13059 (June 5, 2008) (Faro Technologies, Inc., agreed to approximately
$1.8 million in disgorgement as part of a total NPA settlement of approximately $2.9 million);
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Willbros Group, Inc., et al., SEC Litigation Release No. 20,571, 93
SEC Docket 723 (May 14, 2008) (Willbros Group, Inc. agreed to approximately $10.3 million
in disgorgement as part of a DPA settlement of approximately $32.3 million); Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. AB Volvo, SEC Litigation Release No. 20,504, 92 SEC Docket 2804 (Mar. 20,
2008) (AB Volvo agreed to approximately $8.6 million in disgorgement as part of a total DPA
settlement of approximately $19.6 million); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Flowserve Corp., SEC
Litigation Release No. 20,461, 92 SEC Docket 1999 (Feb. 21, 2008) (Flowserve Corp. agreed
to approximately $3.2 million in disgorgement as part of a DPA settlement of approximately
$10.5 million); In re Westinghouse Air Brake Techs. Corp., SEC Administrative Proceeding
File No. 3-12957 (Feb. 14, 2008) (Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp. agreed to
approximately $289,000 in disgorgement as part of a $675,000 DPA settlement).
95. See Press Release, DOJ, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal
Fines (Dec. 15, 2008); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Siemens AG, SEC Litigation Release No.
20,829 (Dec. 15, 2008).
96. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2008 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 5, 2009),
http://www.gibsondunn.comPublications/Pages/2008Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter
Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA Update].
97. Some corporate counsels are finally recommending that "the disgorgement of prof-
its[] should get the attention of most general counsel and chief compliance officers." Why The
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This change in the United States has taken place against the back-
drop of SOX, but without a change in statutory authority specifically
addressed to foreign bribery cases. Yet, the increase in U.S. enforcement
arises at the same time that other sovereigns are becoming increasingly
active in the foreign bribery arena, raising questions about which penal-
ties are statutorily authorized and normatively preferable for foreign
bribery cases. Such normative analysis must necessarily include consid-
eration of the evolving prohibition of international bribery pursuant to
the international conventions discussed above.98
B. Foreign Enforcement
The decade beginning in 2000 has marked the first period in history
that many States have operated under ratified international agreements to
control corruption and transnational bribery. The challenge in analyzing
implementing legislation passed under the UNCAC and the OECD Con-
vention, however, is that, while these statutes purport to implement the
same agreements, the divergence in the legislative approaches to such
implementation is significant. While some foreign statutes track the
FCPA quite closely,99 others do not. The Hungarian Criminal Code, for
example, prohibits bribery of a foreign official and establishes penal
sanctions for such bribery pursuant to the OECD Convention; however,
the bribing party is not subject to punishment if she feared unlawful dis-
advantage for refusing to offer the bribe.' °° Such a loophole allows the
precise conduct that the FCPA was designed to prohibit.
A canvass of the existing foreign statutes under the OECD Conven-
tion reveals that codification of laws against foreign bribery is a
relatively new and widespread trend in response to the international
agreements discussed above. A first wave of States enacting such legisla-
tion, including Canada and Germany, passed implementing legislation
shortly following the entry into force of the OECD Convention.'O In
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Is High on Everyone's Radar Screen, METRO. CORP. COUNS.,
Dec. 2007, at 19.
98. See discussion supra Part I.B.
99. See, e.g., Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1998 S.C., ch. 34 (Can.).
100. Biintet6T'6rvdnykonyv [BTK] [Penal Code], Title VII, § 258B, para. 3 (Hung.),
translated in 3 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER app. E-51, E-53 (West, 2d ed.
2008).
101. See Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1998 S.C., ch. 34 (Can.). For a
general explanation of Canada's analogue to the FCPA, see Dep't of Justice, The Corruption
of Foreign Public Officials Act A Guide (1999) (Can.), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/
eng/dept-min/pub/cfpoa-lcape/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009); see also OECD, Direc-
torate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Germany: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions, at 5, para. 7 (June 4, 2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
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2000 and 2001, thirteen countries, including France and Japan,' 2 passed
52/9/2958732.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Germany: Phase 2 Report]. The other States in this first
wave included the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Nor-
way, Slovakia, and Sweden. See OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Czech
Republic: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation
on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 8, para. 14 (Oct. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/59/37727436.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Czech
Republic: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Finland Review of Implementation of the Convention and
1997 Recommendation, at 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/20/2386203.pdf
[hereinafter OECD, Finland Review of Implementation]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal &
Enter. Aff., Greece: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 7, para. 13
(Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/13/35140946.pdf [hereinafter
OECD, Greece: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Hungary:
Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 4, para. 1 (May 6, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/34/34918600.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Hungary: Phase 2
Report]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Iceland: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 4, para. 1 (Feb. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/8/2498248.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Iceland: Phase 2 Re-
port]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Korea: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 7, para. 12 (Nov. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/13/33910834.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Korea: Phase 2 Re-
port]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Mexico: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 3, para. 1 (Sept. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/31/33746033.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Mexico: Phase 2 Re-
port]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Norway: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 6, para. 12 (Apr. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/28/31568595.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Norway: Phase 2 Re-
port]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Slovak Republic: Phase 2 Report on
the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 7, para. 11 (Nov. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/15/35778308.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Slovak Republic:
Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Sweden: Phase 2 Report on
the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 7 n.1 (Sept. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/8/35394676.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Sweden: Phase 2 Re-
port].
102. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., France: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
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legislation implementing the OECD Convention and explicitly prohibit-
ing foreign bribery.10 3 In addition, the attacks of September 11, 2001,
International Business Transactions, at 5, para. 1 (Jan. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/36/26242055.pdf [hereinafter OECD, France: Phase 2 Re-
port]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Japan: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 8-9, para. 24 (Mar. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/7/34554382.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Japan: Phase 2 Report].
103. The States included Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. See e.g., OECD, France: Phase 2 Report,
supra note 102, at 5, para. 1; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Ireland: Phase
2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 7, para. 23 (Mar. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/45/38322693.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Ireland: Phase 2 Re-
port]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Italy: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 7, para. 14 (Nov. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/50/33995536.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Italy: Phase 2 Report];
OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Luxembourg: Phase 2 Report on the Appli-
cation of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International
Business Transactions, at 5, para. 8 (May 28, 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/55/4/32017636.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Luxembourg: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Di-
rectorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., The Netherlands: Phase 2 Report on the Application of
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions, at 10, para. 22 (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
14/49/36993012.pdf [hereinafter OECD, The Netherlands: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Director-
ate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., New Zealand: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions, at 9, para. 11 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
57/38/37658136.pdf [hereinafter OECD, New Zealand: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Directorate
for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Poland: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the
1997 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,
at 8, para. 8 (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/54/38030514.pdf
[hereinafter OECD, Poland: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter.
Aff., Portugal: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Revised Recom-
mendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 8, para. 13 (Mar.
14, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/24/383201 I0.pdf [hereinafter
OECD, Portugal: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Spain:
Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, at I1, para. 28 (Mar. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/35/36392481.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Spain: Phase 2 Re-
port]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Switzerland: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
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spurred the United Kingdom to pass the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Se-
curity Act of 2001, '04 which included implementation of the OECD
Convention.' 5 Also, in 2001, Slovenia became the first non-OECD State
to accede to the Convention.'0 Brazil, Chile, and Turkey implemented
the Convention through penal code amendments in 2002 and 2003.107 In
2005, Bulgaria implemented the OECD's recommendations and brought
corporations under the reach of its foreign bribery law for the first
time.' 8 Several States that ratified the OECD Convention more recently
have yet to fully implement its requirements in their own laws but are
currently working to do so.'09
International Business Transactions, at 5, para. 6 (Dec. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/16/34350161.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Switzerland: Phase 2
Report]. The OECD noted, however, that Spain's implementing legislation was inconsistent
with the Convention.
104. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).
105. See OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., United Kingdom: Phase 2
Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating
Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 8, para. 20 (Mar. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/32/34599062.pdf [hereinafter OECD, United Kingdom:
Phase 2 Report].
106. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Slovenia: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 7, para. 9 (June 21, 2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/59/38883195.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Slovenia: Phase 2
Report]. It had passed legislation prohibiting foreign bribery before its accession in 1999, and
amended that legislation to comply with the Convention in 2004. Id.
107. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Brazil: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 7, para. 10 (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/61/30/39801089.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Brazil: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Directorate
for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Chile: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the
1997 Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,
at 7, para. 11 (Oct. 11, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/10/39540391.pdf
[hereinafter OECD, Chile: Phase 2 Report]; OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff.,
Turkey: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Revised
Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 8, para. 15
(Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/46/39862163.pdf [hereinafter
OECD, Turkey: Phase 2 Report].
108. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Bulgaria: Phase 2 Follow-Up
Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations on the Application of
the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, at 3, 14 (Jan. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/60/36101867.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Bulgaria: Phase 2
Follow-Up Report].
109. See, e.g., OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Estonia: Phase 2 Report
on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
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An examination of these implementing laws reveals that typically,
but not always, implementing legislation provides that the violator is
subject to a disgorgement-like loss of any profits of the illegal activity.
The result of these statutes is that multinational firms may be subject to
disgorgement-like penalties in dozens of jurisdictions for the same con-
duct and the same resulting profits. The penal codes of at least twenty-
one countries include provisions for "forfeiture" or "confiscation" of the
proceeds of a crime or base the amount of a fine on such proceeds."'
Among countries that authorize confiscation of the proceeds of a bribe,
at least five include this as a mandatory penalty resulting from convic-
tion."' Although a majority of States include disgorgement or
confiscation in their laws, the statutes in a minority of countries-Chile
and Greece, for example-do not, typically because they do not extend
any liability for violations of laws prohibiting foreign bribery to corpora-
tions and other legal persons."2 Moreover, some States, such as France,
which authorizes confiscation of the proceeds of a crime, in practice
rarely impose such a penalty because, in the words of one French magis-
trate, it "is not a part of French legal 'culture."" 3
A complicating factor in describing the statutes on foreign bribery is
the degree to which these statutes apply extraterritorially. The FCPA has
wide extraterritorial application because jurisdiction can be based on
traditional territorial underpinnings or on a nationality theory of jurisdic-
tion. Typically, jurisdiction for U.S. courts over parties accused of
International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 9, para. 10 (June 20, 2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/57/40953976.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Estonia: Phase 2 Re-
port].
110. Other States, such as Argentina, for example, are in the process of amending their
laws to apply such forfeiture or disgorgement provisions. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal
& Enter. Aff., Argentina: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Rec-
ommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 47-51 (June
20, 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/28/40975295.pdf [hereinafter
OECD, Argentina: Phase 2 Report]. Countries such as Bulgaria have amended their penal
codes to incorporate corporate liability for foreign bribery following recommendations from
the OECD. See OECD, Bulgaria: Phase 2 Follow-Up Report, supra note 108, at 3.
Ill. See OECD, Brazil: Phase 2 Report, supra note 107, at 56; OECD, Italy: Phase 2
Report, supra note 103, at 47-48; OECD, Norway: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 46;
OECD, Poland: Phase 2 Report, supra note 103, at 59; OECD, Slovenia: Phase 2 Report,
supra note 106, at 62, para. 177.
112. See, e.g., OECD, Chile: Phase 2 Report, supra note 107, at 39, 45, para. 185;
OECD, Greece: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 40.
113. OECD, France: Phase 2 Report, supra note 102, at 57; see also OECD, Japan:
Phase 2 Report, supra note 102, at 51, para. 186 (stating that it is "unclear" to the OECD
whether Japan's confiscation provisions cover the confiscation of proceeds relating to the
bribery of a foreign official).
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foreign bribery will be construed very broadly."4 This creates significant
opportunities for jurisdictional overlap. Belgium, for example, prohibits
foreign bribery under a universal jurisdiction statute that applies to "any
person" "who is neither a Belgian national nor has their principle place
of residence in Belgium.""' Brazilian authorities have asserted that an
offense need only to have "touched" Brazilian territory for jurisdiction to
be valid." 6 Under this interpretation "a telephone call, fax, or email ema-
nating from Brazil would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction over an
offence of foreign bribery which mostly takes place elsewhere.""' At
least seventeen other States similarly employ broad jurisdiction that
could result in an individual or firm facing foreign bribery charges and
being subject to prosecutions in multiple jurisdictions for the same un-
derlying conduct.' On the other hand, Canada, for example, does not
114. DEMING, supra note I], at 7-10.
115. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aft., Belgium: Phase 2 Report on the
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 33 (July 21, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/59/8/35461651 .pdf [hereinafter OECD, Belgium: Phase 2 Report] (noting, however,
that the OECD believes that there are practical difficulties to Belgium bringing a case with
tenuous jurisdictional linkages).
116. OECD, Brazil: Phase 2 Report, supra note 107, at 44-45 (cautioning, however, that
Brazil's statutory scheme does not yet apply to legal persons).
117. Id.
118. OECD, Czech Republic: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 35 (stating that Czech
territorial and nationality jurisdiction extends to an act performed outside of Czech borders
that "violates or threatens an interest" in the Czech Republic as well as to Czech nationals
regardless of where the crime is committed); OECD, France: Phase 2 Report, supra note 102,
at 44 ("The scope of French criminal law is extensive ... which makes it possible in certain
circumstances to prosecute offences committed outside French territory."); OECD, Hungary:
Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 53 (describing Hungary's jurisdiction as nearly as broad as
possible and perhaps as universal); OECD, Iceland: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 30-31
(stating that Iceland employs universal jurisdiction for the bribery of foreign officials); OECD,
Ireland: Phase 2 Report, supra note 103, at 41 (noting that Ireland does not provide as broad a
jurisdictional reach as some nations but that it does specifically provide for extraterritorial
jurisdiction for foreign bribery offenses, which is "atypical" in Irish law); OECD, Japan:
Phase 2 Report, supra note 102, at 46; OECD, Luxembourg: Phase 2 Report, supra note 103,
at 33-34; OECD, Mexico Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommen-
dation, at 11-13, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/30/2388858.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter Mexico Review of Implementation]; OECD, New Zealand: Phase 2 Report, supra
note 103, at 47-48 (noting that New Zealand territorial jurisdiction is more narrow than the
United Kingdom's, but that, on balance, New Zealand has a broad jurisdictional grant, includ-
ing over legal persons); OECD, Norway: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 43-44
("Compared to the [OECD] Convention, which only requires jurisdiction based on active
nationality and territoriality, the Norwegian jurisdiction is more far reaching."); OECD, Portu-
gal: Phase 2 Report, supra note 103, at 50-51; OECD, Slovak Republic: Phase 2 Report,
supra note 101, at 32-33; OECD, Slovenia: Phase 2 Report, supra note 106, at 49; OECD,
Spain: Phase 2 Report, supra note 103, at 31 (noting, however, that Spain was in the process
of updating liability as to legal persons); OECD, Sweden: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at
51; OECD, Switzerland: Phase 2 Report, supra note 103, at 35-36 (noting, however, that a
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provide for nationality jurisdiction in its prohibition on foreign bribery."9
Instead, it grounds jurisdiction territorially--exercising jurisdiction only
over acts that occurred in Canada-resulting in a narrower application of
its foreign bribery statute than many other OECD Member States. 20 Fi-
nally, some States employ a dual criminality requirement for a finding of
nationality jurisdiction, insisting that the conduct in question be a crime
in the place where it occurred and that the party against whom sanctions
are to be imposed is a national of the imposing State."' Despite these
exceptions, the majority of States that have criminalized foreign bribery
provide for broad jurisdiction under both territorial and nationality theo-
ries, and there is a trend toward a broad conception of jurisdiction.' 2
While the foreign anti-bribery statutes are themselves relatively new,
it is only in the last three or four years that multinational firms have
needed to pay attention to enforcement actions brought by foreign gov-
ernments, which are an even more recent and faster accelerating trend. In
addition to foreign statutes, it is important to examine the actual foreign
enforcement levels, as an unenforced statute has limited relevance for
global foreign bribery enforcement. Some of the best data comes from
Transparency International (TI), a global network of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) funded by bilateral donors, foundations, and the
loophole for limited territorial jurisdiction may exist); OECD, United Kingdom: Phase 2 Re-
port, supra note 105, at 66-67.
119. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Canada: Phase 2 Follow-Up Re-
port on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations on the Application of the
Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, at 5, para. 9 (June 21, 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/6/36984779.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Canada: Phase 2 Follow-
Up Report].
120. Id. Likewise, Denmark does not provide for nationality jurisdiction for corporations
and other legal persons. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Denmark: Phase 2
Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations, at 4, para. 9 (July
29, 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/56/41073747.pdf [hereinafter OECD,
Denmark: Phase 2 Follow-Up Report]; see also OECD, Chile: Phase 2 Report, supra note
107, at 38-39 (describing Chile as retaining territorial jurisdiction but noting that it is unclear
whether nationality jurisdiction exists and that Chile has not yet adopted jurisdiction over
legal persons); OECD, Greece: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 28-29, 35 (noting that
Greece provides for territorial jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction only in response to a
complaint by the government of the country in which the crime was committed and that the
"effective seat" theory is used for jurisdiction for legal persons).
121. See, e.g., OECD, Estonia: Phase 2 Report, supra note 109, at 42-43 (stating that
whether Estonia could establish universal jurisdiction is debatable, but noting that nationality
jurisdiction is not valid over legal persons in Estonia).
122. See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text. But see OECD, Korea: Phase 2
Report, supra note 101, at 37-38 (stating that it is unclear to the OECD whether territorial or
nationality jurisdiction could be applied against a corporation in a foreign bribery case, despite
claims from Korean officials that jurisdiction could be proper).
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private sector.' 23 In its first OECD Convention Progress Report in 2004,
TI stated that there were only four States that had brought more than one
enforcement action under legislation passed pursuant to the OECD Con-
vention. 124 As of 2008, however, enforcement actions abroad had become
more commonplace, and TI's 2008 Progress Report showed "significant
enforcement in sixteen countries," which was an increase over the previ-
ous year2 2 The 2008 TI Report identified 147 foreign bribery cases and
at least 198 foreign bribery investigations, by governments not including
the United States in 2008.126 Other sources likewise indicate a rise in
both the number and significance of foreign investigations and prosecu-
tions.27 Commentators have noted a number of major prosecutions in
Australia, France, Germany, and other OECD Member States.
28
Such investigations are, however, not limited to Western States,' 29 nor
to States often considered major strategic allies of the United States. 30
Bolivia, for example, has expressed its desire and intention to prosecute,
among others, former Enron executives and executives of the Bolivian
state oil company due to "irregularities" in contracts relating to a pipe-
line between Bolivia and Brazil. 3' China has attempted to crack down on
corruption in the purchasing of large hospital equipment and also has
named IBM and Hitachi in the sentencing of the former head of the
China Construction Bank to fifteen years in prison for accepting bribes
123. See HOUSE OF COMMONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
FOURTH REPORT MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 2000-1, H.C. 39-I, available at http://www.public
ations.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmintdev/39/0111411 .htm.
124. FRITZ HEIMANN, GILLIAN DELL, AGNES SNG-SACHSENROEDER & NICOLE WHIT-
TIER, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 2005 1 (Mar. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/2577/14887/file/TIProg-RepOECD.pdf.
125. FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, PROGRESS REPORT 2008
8 (June 24, 2008), http://www.transparency.org/content/download/33627/516718.pdf (noting
also that that "[flocusing on G-7 countries, enforcement has increased substantially").
126. Id. at 7. Transparency International calculated that, in 2008, the United States
brought 103 foreign bribery cases and conducted sixty-nine foreign bribery investigations. Id.
127. See, e.g., Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 96 (describing the
"[i]nternationalization of foreign anti-corruption enforcement" as one of the most important
foreign bribery enforcement trends in 2008).
128. A number of commentators anecdotally have reported on foreign enforcement ac-
tions abroad, although none have attempted to discuss the foreign statutes in detail. See, e.g.,
Margaret Ayres, John Davis, Nicole Healy & Alexandra Wrage, Developments in U.S. and
International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT'L LAW. 597, 604-08 (2007); Kathleen M.
Hamann et. al, Developments in US. and International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 40
INT'L LAW. 417,423-27 (2006).
129. For example, in 2005, Indonesia investigated whether Monsanto had made im-
proper payments to Indonesian environmental and agricultural officials. KPK Continues
Monsanto Probe, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at 4.
130. See Ayres et al., supra note 128, at 604-08.
131. See Bolivia Wants to Prosecute Business Executives and Former Government Offi-
cials over Pipeline Deal, GLOBAL INSIGHT, June 26, 2006.
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from those, and other, companies.13 Finally, even in States that have not
yet successfully prosecuted a case of foreign bribery, progress toward
that goal continues, and firms should be increasingly aware of foreign
bribery investigations and prosecutions across dozens of transnational
jurisdictions.' This is a new reality in compliance management for mul-
tinational corporations, and one to which they must adjust quickly as
foreign enforcement and prosecutions catch up with the relatively new
foreign legislative regimes.
III. DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS: STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION,
NORMATIVE CONCERNS, AND INTERNATIONAL
LESSONS AND COMPLICATIONS
This Part argues that there are a number of reasons why, in the FCPA
context, the justification for disgorgement of profits is questionable and
the practicalities complicated. Part III.A asserts that disgorgement is a
statutorily authorized form of penalty, although perhaps not one envi-
sioned by Congress. Part III.B discusses issues of extraterritorial effect
and redundant jurisdiction, and Part flI.C claims that both utilitarian and
retributivist theories underlying disgorgement are not completely sup-
ported in the FCPA context because of problems of disproportionality
and evidentiary difficulty. Part III.D then argues that concerns over ex-
cessive prosecutorial discretion further counsel against disgorgement in
the FCPA enforcement context.
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission Is Statutorily
Empowered to Seek Disgorgement
The history surrounding the passage of the FCPA indicates that it is
unclear whether Congress intended that the SEC pursue disgorgement in
FCPA enforcement. This fact alone should at least give pause to question
the normative function of disgorgement. The primary purpose for the
adoption of the FCPA was the elimination of corrupt business practices,
132. David Barboza, IBM, NCR and Hitachi Cited in Bribery Verdict, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 1, 2006, at Finance 10; Mure Dickie, Beijing in Campaign to Stop Medical Kick-
backs, FIN. TIMES (London), July 21, 2006, at 5.
133. See, e.g., OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Finland: Phase 2 Follow-
Up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations on the Apptication of
the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, at 3-5 (Feb. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/13/36373405.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Finland: Phase 2 Fol-
low-Up Report].
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particularly foreign bribery.' 4 The focus of the SEC's accounting and
record-keeping provisions, and one of the reasons that those sections-
unlike the anti-bribery provisions-were passed as amendments to the
Exchange Act,' was Congress's recognition that a primary method for
concealing such activity was through SEC-regulated record keeping.
136
The SEC's use of fines long reflected what seems apparent from consid-
eration of the FCPA: SEC fines exist to protect investors and to punish
and deter corporate malfeasance. Fines imposed for bribery are not part
of the SEC's general fining authority under § 21(d)(3) of the Exchange
Act; they are instead separately provided for by § 32(c),'37 which Con-
gress added to the Exchange Act as part of the 1988 FCPA
amendments.'38 However, illegal payments will almost certainly impli-
cate other violations of the securities laws, which are subject to the
SEC's general fining authority pursuant to § 21(d)(3). As a result, bribes
typically have resulted in fines under § 21(d)(3) that are much higher
than the relatively small fines authorized by § 32(c) (i.e., $600,000 per
violation by an issuer).'3 9 Neither the reports of the House or Senate '4
°
floor discussion of the FCPA or its subsequent amendments, 4 ' nor the
1981 follow-up report from the U.S. General Accounting Office on cor-
porate bribery and the FCPA, mention disgorgement as a remedy.'42 The
lack of any statement that disgorgement should be part of the SEC's en-
forcement arsenal, and the rarity of the remedy at the time that Congress
passed the FCPA and its amendments, "4 are reasons that some commen-
tators have cited in questioning the propriety of the penalty. '4
134. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988). But see Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara
Crutchfield George, Expansion of SEC Authority into Internal Corporate Governance: The
Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Re-
view), 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119, 153 (1998) (claiming that the FCPA was the broadest
application of federal law to corporate boards since the passage of the Exchange Act itself
(citing ROBERA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 42 (1982))).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1988).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1988).
137. Gerlach & Parizek, supra note 36, at 14-4.
138. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 10A INT'L CAP. MARKETS & SEC.
REG. § 22:7; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(g) (West 2009).
139. Gerlach & Parizek, supra note 36, at 14-4.
140. See S. REP. No. 95-114 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95--640 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-
831 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
141. The FCPA passed the House on the suspension calendar, H.R. RES. 3815, 95th
Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 36,303-08 (1977), and the Senate by unanimous consent, S. RES. 305,
95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 13,818-23 (1977), with no discussion of the penalties for violat-
ing the Act.
142. U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, Report to the Congress: Impact of Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act on U.S. Business (1981).
143. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Doty, supra note 84, at 1235.
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The most recent change to the way in which the SEC enforces the
FCPA-and a critical development to consider-is SOX, which affects
virtually all of the SEC's prosecutions, including those under the FCPA.
When assessing penalties, the SEC draws on SOX to provide great lati-
tude in determining the types of penalties it enforces. While SOX did not
amend the FCPA itself, it did amend both civil and criminal securities
laws relating to compliance, internal controls, and penalties for viola-
tions of the Exchange Act.' Since the enactment of SOX, the SEC has
possessed the power to designate how a particular penalty that it assesses
will be classified. 46 In the "Fair Funds for Investors" provision of
SOX, 14 7 Congress granted the SEC the discretion to earmark monies col-
lected as civil penalties in a particular action to either the U.S.
Department of the Treasury or to a fund benefiting the victims of the
conduct that resulted in that SEC action, typically shareholders.' 48 This
discretion, however, resulted in ambiguities as to how the SEC would
choose to classify penalties.
In 2006, the SEC issued a policy statement, similar in tone, purpose,
and content to the Holder and Thompson memos,'4 9 describing its deci-
sion-making process in the imposition of civil penalties on
corporations.5 0 The SEC penalty statement clarifies that the factors that
go into the SEC's determination as to whether penalties will be enforced
as monetary penalties earmarked for the Treasury, or considered dis-
gorgement, in which case the SEC has the discretion to distribute the
funds as "Fair Funds" under SOX or to send the funds to the Treasury, is
"whether the issuer's violation has provided an improper benefit to the
shareholders, or conversely whether the violation has resulted in harm to
the shareholders.' ' 5 ' Thus, in FCPA disgorgement, while corporations
pay the Treasury, it remains conceptually strange that the SEC uses a
theory of punishment based on compensating shareholders when the
shareholders likely benefited from the bribery.
145. Matt A. Vega, Sarbanes-Oxley & the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Territorial
Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forth-
coming 2009).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(b).
147. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308(a), 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. IV
2004)).
148. Marvin E. Sprouse III, A Collision of Fairness: Sarbanes-Oxley and §510(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2005, at 8.
149. See Holder Memo, supra note 75; Thompson Memo, supra note 75.
150. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http:llwww.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
151. Id.
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The legislative history of SOX shows no indication that Congress
was considering a change in the type of enforcement or the theories of
punishment under which a firm could be liable for foreign bribery. SOX
was passed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals when the
focus was on corporate governance of transnational corporations gener-
ally, but not as it related to foreign bribery, an area in which the SEC still
exercised very little enforcement authority in 2002.52
Although Congress never explicitly considered the relevance and de-
sirability of disgorgement in the FCPA context, this Note does not argue
that disgorgement is statutorily impermissible nor even undesirable. The
OECD Convention requires a forfeiture remedy,153 and disgorgement is
clearly authorized by statute without a limitation as to the FCPA.'54 For
some analysts, this statutory authorization would be the end of the in-
quiry, even if achieved through interrelated statutes showing no clear
congressional intent that disgorgement apply to FCPA prosecutions. In
addition, lacking any congressional statement to the contrary, there may
be no reason why SOX should not drive the SEC's prosecutorial deci-
sions in the FCPA realm. This Note, however, does question whether
Congress's silence on the issue should provide the normative justifica-
tion for the rapid expansion of disgorgement and concludes that it should
not. It does not question the deterrent value of properly calibrated dis-
gorgement, but rather doubts that such calibration is possible or likely
given the jurisdictional and evidentiary problems discussed below.
B. Extraterritoriality and the Effect on Theories of Punishment
Until the 1998 amendments to the FCPA, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Act was limited, and the FCPA "reflected Congress's
sensitivity to 'possible conflicts with principles of international law and
comity that could result from the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over for-
eign nationals outside the territorial United States."" 5 5 At least one
commentator has noted that "'the enlargement' of the extraterritorial
effect of the [FCPA's] antibribery provisions may prove to be the most
significant and challenging foray by the United States into the regulation
152. See discussion supra Part II.A.
153. OECD Convention, supra note 18, art. 3(3).
154. Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 202(a), 203 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (2000)).
155. Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United
States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73
FOROHAM L. REV. 2897, 2917 (2005) (citing H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Under the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's
Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239, 293 (2001)).
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of international business"' because "nearly any contact with the United
States 'will subject a foreign national to prosecution in a U.S. court." 56
Apart from criticisms that the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA ex-
ceeds U.S. jurisdictional power,'57 or that the FCPA is culturally
intrusive,'58 the extraterritorial reach of the Act has the potential to create
inefficient over-enforcement problems as many States adopt similarly
extraterritorial anti-bribery legislation of their own. When a national
regulator brings an enforcement action against a multinational firm in
one jurisdiction, this attention may induce action on the part of national
regulators in other jurisdictions.'59 Even for corporations that enter into,
for example, a DPA with the DOJ and the SEC while working to genu-
inely reform their foreign bribery compliance, "[t]hese companies may
still face additional sanctions or enforcement actions from other federal
or state agencies, as well as from foreign governments."'6° This concern
is aggravated by language in the OECD Convention stating that the as-
sumptions of territorial jurisdiction in the OECD are to be "interpreted
broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not
required.' 6' This is a much broader conception of territorial jurisdiction
than is typically recognized in international law, 62 and this possibility for
jurisdictional redundancies is a key difference in comparing the propri-
ety of disgorgement in the FCPA context with its use in contexts in
which the United States is more likely to be the only national regulator.
These problems of overlapping jurisdiction under numerous extrater-
ritorial statutes are exacerbated by the responsibility of issuers for
subsidiaries. In its original form, the FCPA was "silent on the issue of
the legal responsibility of an issuer for compliance by subsidiaries with
either of the accounting requirements."'' 63 The 1988 amendments to the
FCPA, however, created potential liability for issuers for the actions of
their subsidiaries, particularly if the issuer holds a majority interest in a
domestic or foreign subsidiary. '64 While, in theory, a U.S. parent firm
156. Id.
157. See Brown, supra note 155, at 293 n.203.
158. Stephen R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 275 (1997); see Stephen R. Salbu, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419,
430-33, 447 (1999).
159. See Lords Says SFO Saudi Move Lawful, BBC NEWS, July 30, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business17532714.stm; see also Huskins, supra note 60, at 1450.
160. Kathleen M. Hamann et al., Developments in U.S. and International Efforts to Pre-
vent Corruption, 40 INT'L LAW. 417, 418 (2006).
161. OECD Convention, supra note 18, annex, at 25.
162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1987).
163. S. REP. No. 100-85, at 43 (1987).
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6).
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could avoid liability for the actions of a foreign subsidiary if it did not
participate in the bribery and had no knowledge of it, in practice, the
U.S. parent firm usually risks FCPA liability for bribery schemes con-
ducted by foreign subsidiaries. This parent responsibility may be
appropriate in many cases, but can create further redundancies or penal-
ize undeterrable conduct in others.'65 Thus, as multinational corporations
hold majority interests in more and more foreign subsidiaries, they run
the risk of further FCPA liability. In addition, the existence of those for-
eign subsidiaries is likely to attract the attention of increasingly diverse
foreign regulators that may or may not focus on prosecutorial coopera-
tion with the United States or other foreign regulators.
Admittedly, the problems of overlapping jurisdiction and liability for
subsidiaries are not dispositive in favor of requiring a new approach by
the SEC to disgorgement. International agreements on mutual legal as-
sistance (MLA) are at least cognizant of this potential overlap in
regulatory authority for the same wrongdoing, 6 6 although an interna-
tional, multilateral method for resolving this issue of jurisdictional
overlap is lacking. The UNCAC, for example, includes permissive lan-
guage that when one national regulator discovers that another is bringing
an enforcement action, "State Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one
another with a view to coordinating actions."'' 67 Yet, in the following sub-
section, the UNCAC states that "this Convention shall not exclude the
exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in ac-
cordance with its domestic law."' 68 For the corporate compliance officer,
there is some reassurance from the 2006 Statoil settlement, in which the
$3.5 million that Statoil had already paid to the Norwegian National Au-
thority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic Crime was
deducted from its U.S. settlement of $22 million.'6 1 Yet, even if a corpo-
ration could know that it would only be subject to the enforcement
actions of one sovereign's agencies--or know that its payments to one
sovereign would be credited against those enforced by another-there
is no predictability unless the corporation has a means to know which
165. Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA in Russia and Other For-
mer Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 378, 381-82 (1997); see also Sec. & Exch.
Reg. Comm'n v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 1:04CV00945, 2004 WL 2057340, at *para. 11
(D.D.C. June 9, 2004).
166. See, e.g., OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Australia: Phase 2 Re-
port on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Business Transactions, at 54 (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/57/42/35937659.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Australia: Phase 2 Report].
167. UNCAC, supra note 19, art. 42(5)-(6).
168. Id. art. 42(6).
169. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Sanctions Statoil for Bribes to
Iranian Government Official (Oct. 13, 2006); NEWCOMB & UROFSKY, supra note 69, at 35.
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sovereigns it may be subject to and to what degree they will cooperate.
For example, while arguing that the DOJ takes settlements with foreign
regulators into account in its own FCPA enforcement, the DOJ's Deputy
Chief of the Fraud Section, Mark Mendelsohn, also conceded that the
United States does not recognize the concept of "international double
jeopardy."'70
While minimizing uncertainty may not be required in a fairness or
due process sense, it should at least be a normative goal. While reducing
bribery is clearly important, overdeterring bribery could lead firms to
underinvest in foreign infrastructure projects, which would have negative
consequences both for firms and for foreign nations, particularly those
developing nations that require foreign capital for major projects. There
are clear areas in which the current legal regime creates uncertainty
without providing a benefit on the other side of the ledger-besides
lawmakers and regulators avoiding the opportunity cost of lawmaking
and regulating. Brazil, for example, had entered into bilateral MLA trea-
ties with five other States as of December 2007. 1 ' For countries with
which Brazil has not enacted such a treaty, MLA will typically be pro-
vided on an ad hoc, reciprocal basis, but it remains unclear, perhaps
because of the lack of formal guidelines, whether Brazil will provide
MLA in any given case. 72 This uncertainty is common in examining the
international foreign bribery regime, and more formality-and, thus,
more certainty for firms facing multinational jurisdiction and investiga-
tion-would create a greater incentive for foreign investment without
necessarily hindering regulators' bribery enforcement efforts or facilitat-
ing firms' avoidance of such enforcement. 73 To the extent that the
regulatory scheme owes some level of consistency and predictability to
the parties that it seeks to regulate, the international foreign bribery re-
gime's ad hoc nature and its potential liability for multiple disgorgement
170. Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 96.
171. OECD, Brazil: Phase 2 Report, supra note 107, at 39.
172. Id. at 40. The report notes that,
since Brazil currently has only five treaties with Parties to the Convention, in the
absence of practical examples where Brazil has provided assistance to Parties to the
OECD Convention ... how effectively the principle of reciprocity is applied is a
significant factor in determining how well Brazil applies Article 9 of the Conven-
tion[, which addresses mutual legal assistance].
Id.
173. The OECD has also called for increased formality in mutual legal assistance (MLA)
agreements to ensure more structured, effective, and immediate cooperation among multilat-
eral regulatory authorities. See OECD, Belgium: Phase 2 Report, supra note 115, at 29.
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actions fail to deliver predictability, particularly to multinational corpo-
rations.
74
Despite MLA and informal cooperative agreements, the concerns of
overlapping jurisdiction and responsibility for subsidiaries are not
merely hypothetical exercises. Other commentators have noted that U.S.
firms will continue to face increased scrutiny from multiple foreign regu-
lators, often without constitutional safeguards.'75 Indeed, there are an
increasing number of examples of multiple, transnational regulatory au-
thorities investigating the same corporation for the same conduct. '16 The
Halliburton-TSKJ investigation, for example, arose out of allegations
that TSKJ, a Halliburton subsidiary, engaged in bribery in Nigeria as part
of its efforts to win contracts to build and expand a liquefied natural gas
project in that country.'77 Nigeria has a reputation as one of the world's
hotbeds of corruption,' and some companies have gone so far as to
cease doing business there entirely in order to avoid the corruption liabil-
ity.'7 9 Authorities that have investigated Halliburton regarding the TSKJ
contracts include the DOJ,80 the SEC,"' Nigeria's national assembly and
its Economic and Financial Crimes Commission," 2 the United King-
dom's Serious Frauds Office,'83 and the French magistrate who initially
opened the Investigation.
It is likely that many of the investigating regulatory bodies will work
together, but the SEC only maintains memoranda of understanding
174. See Doty, supra note 84, at 1235; see also Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA
Update, supra note 96 (describing the wide discretion of the DOJ as to whether to credit for-
eign penalty payments against FCPA liability).
175. See, e.g., Sebelius, supra note 84, at 604.
176. See, e.g., infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
177. See Ken Silverstein, Investigation Widens in Nigeria Oil Case Involving Hallibur-
ton, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at 6.
178. Transparency International's most recent Corruption Perceptions index ranked Ni-
geria 147th out of 179 countries surveyed. See Transparency Int'l, Corruption Perceptions
Index 2007, http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi/2007 (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2009).
179. See Press Release, Panalpina, Panalpina Reports Dynamic Growth in the First Half
Year (July 30, 2008), available at http://www.panalpina.com/www/global/en/media-news/
news/news-archiv_2/08_07_30.html.
180. Halliburton Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2008).
181. Id.
182. Nick Snow, DOJ, SEC Probe Bonny Island Partners for Violations, 104 OIL & GAS
J. 26, 26-27 (Nov. 13, 2006).
183. Id.
184. Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton
Co./TSKJ's Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption
Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
503, 504-05 (2006).
185. Following the discovery of the alleged bribes, the French regulatory body informed
the appropriate U.S. authorities regarding the magistrate's pending investigation. Id. at 508.
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with securities regulators in approximately thirty other States.'86 More-
over, international anti-bribery agreements-which are subscribed to and
implemented by many more than thirty States-provide little in the way
of specifics as to what they require in terms of transnational regulatory
cooperation. As a consequence, there is no requirement that only one
regulator impose disgorgement despite the fact that such penalties should
be based on a specific sum that the violating party gained through the
improper activity.'87 This is further complicated by the fact that it is not
clear what "disgorgement" in the FCPA context really means since it is
often impossible to know the distinct benefit that a firm derived from any
given bribe.
Returning to the problem of overlapping regulators, in the Hallibur-
ton-TSKJ investigation, the office of the Attorney General of Nigeria
sought the transfer of sums of money held in Swiss bank accounts, and it
has subsequently pushed for Nigerian courts to determine the legal own-
ership of those funds.' 8  While this type of case may well be handled
through the cooperation for which the UNCAC strives,189 when there are
large sums of money at stake and increasingly disparate foreign regula-
tory authorities involved, there are no guarantees that such comity and
cooperation shall govern multiple States' regulatory authorities.' 9 Put
another way, it is one thing for a regulator to inform an interested State
that it is investigating a firm, but it is quite another for that regulator to
refrain from seeking fines within its grasp merely because of comity to-
ward foreign regulators.
Halliburton-TSKJ is not the only example of the overlapping extra-
territorial reach of transnational regulators raising concerns about
redundant disgorgement remedies. The August 2008 raid by Argentine
authorities of a Siemens office in Buenos Aires in connection with a
186. See Gerlach & Parizek, supra note 36.
187. But see McVey & Basri, supra note 76 (stating that the OECD Convention "pro-
vides for coordination among prosecutors in anti-bribery enforcement among the OECD
member countries").
188. See George & Lacey, supra note 184, at 509 (citing Halliburton Co., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 16 (Oct. 31, 2005)).
189. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
190. Even a seemingly cooperative State such as New Zealand, for example, is statuto-
rily empowered to refuse a request for assistance from a foreign State if, in the opinion of the
New Zealand Attorney General, "the request relates to the prosecution or punishment of a
person in respect of conduct that occurred ... outside the foreign country and similar conduct
occurring outside New Zealand in similar circumstances would not have constituted an of-
fence against New Zealand law." Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, § 27, para.
2(b), 1992 S.R. No. 86 (N.Z.). Because New Zealand law on bribery of foreign officials takes
a relatively narrow scope, New Zealand could potentially decide not to assist foreign countries
with bribery investigations if the bribery did not take place in New Zealand or involve a New
Zealand citizen. See Crimes Act 1961, § 6, 1961 S.R. No. 43 (N.Z.).
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bribery investigation of the scandal-plagued firm raised further such evi-
dence. 9' As of September 2008, the United States, Greece, Italy, China,
Hungary, Indonesia, and Norway had initiated investigations into
whether Siemens violated domestic anti-corruption laws. 92 While it ap-
pears that at least U.S. and German regulators did, in fact, closely
cooperate in handing down the largest foreign bribery penalties ever
against Siemens, 93 such cooperation is not required by any international
or bilateral agreements. China and Argentina have occasionally refused
to cooperate in the prevailing international regulatory scheme,' 94 and
States such as Bolivia may be motivated to prosecute corporations not by
a desire to deter corporate wrongdoing but by a desire to bring punitive
actions against firms identifiable with a particular State.' 95
Thus, informal agreements on the issue of international regulatory
cooperation do exist, but it is not clear that they can provide the predict-
ability and consistent calculation of penalties that are normatively
desirable to avoid overdeterring investment in foreign projects. While it
would not be undesirable if corruption and bribery disappeared entirely,
overdeterrence and the resulting reduction in investment are harmful
from an efficiency standpoint. Furthermore, punishing at levels greater
than the resulting gain is not supported by the equitable principles under-
lying disgorgement. For example, the companies that have left Nigeria
because of a determination that they had to offer improper payments in
order to remain competitive,'96 may have been less likely to forego bene-
ficial investment in a more certain regulatory climate. Like any
regulatory policy, the primary concern with regulation is decreasing
beneficial private activity and distorting market incentives. Regulatory
uncertainty has been quantitatively shown to be particularly harmful to
investment in other contexts-for example, antitruSt -and, while no
quantitative study is available for foreign bribery, the likely result is
similarly undesirable.
191. Authorities Search Siemens Offices in Argentina, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Aug. 16, 2008,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3569115,00.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
192. See The FCPA Blog: Trouble for Siemens in South America, http://fcpablog.
blogspot.com/2008/08/trouble-for-siemens-in-south-america.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
193. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Charity L. Goodman, Comment, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and
Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 449, 453 (2007)
(noting that Argentine officials publicly acknowledged their inability to pay International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) judgments and that this resulting failure
to participate in the international arbitration scheme set up by the United States calls the entire
system into question).
195. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence
from Antitrust Enforcement, 20 CATO J. 295, 320-22 (2001).
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C. Theories of Punishment: Ambiguities of Proportionality and
Retributivist, Evidentiary Uncertainties
The justification for criminal punishment, in general, rests on either
utilitarian or retributivist grounds.'"8 Under either theory, application in
the FCPA context raises questions regarding the propriety of the SEC's
rapid increase in reliance on disgorgement as part of its enforcement
structure. Part III.C. 1 claims that, to the extent that the rationale for dis-
gorgement in FCPA cases is based on deterrence, the use of
disgorgement raises issues of both efficacy and proportionality. Part
HI.C.2 then asserts that, to the extent that SEC disgorgement operates
under a retributivist rationale, there are reasons to be concerned that the
punishment calculation is often speculative and, thus, that the justifica-
tion for a specific amount of retribution is more likely to be flawed in the
FCPA context than in the typical securities case, in which case an esti-
mate of the profits to be recouped is likely to be close to the actual,
improper gain of the guilty party.
1. (Dis)proportionality in FCPA Cases and Disgorgement Settlements
Theoretically, though not necessarily in practice, disgorgement of
profits can provide perfect deterrence by depriving corporations of the
entirety of the incentive for engaging in illegal bribing.' 99 A perfectly de-
terrent punishment scheme would set the level of punishment at the level
of the expected gains of participating in the criminal behavior." How-
ever, utilitarian rationales for punishment include principles of
proportionality,' and punishment schemes fail a utilitarian test when the
punishment exceeds, or threatens to exceed, the offense. 202 Put another
way, deterrence requires that a punishment be proportionate to the
harm-allowing for some multiplier based on the likelihood of being
caught. Punishments that are not proportionate are not justified under
this utilitarian theory.03 In addition, because corporate officers' incen-
tives may introduce a disconnect between theoretical deterrence on a
corporation and the way that the corporation will actually act, deterrence
198. See JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 27-30 (5th ed. 2004). This is not to discount the rehabilitative justification
for criminal punishment, although this claim is less often raised in justifying punishment of
corporations.
199. See OECD, The Netherlands: Phase 2 Report, supra note 103, at 64.
200. This scheme ignores, of course, the nuances introduced by a calculation of, for
example, reputational harm, difficulty in recruiting future corporate leaders, the likelihood of
being caught, and long-term regulatory scrutiny.
201. KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 198, at 76.
202. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 322-24, 338 (C.K. Ogden
ed., 1931).
203. See Id.
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can be particularly ineffective for punishing corporations.2°4 While this
argument is not unique to the FCPA context, it is a particular cause for
concern if the disgorgement that the SEC seeks under the FCPA is based
entirely on a principle of deterrence. 25
Proportionality is, however, a principle for setting punishment that
can cut in favor of both larger and smaller fines and other penalties; it is
not merely an argument of multinational firms and the defense bar, but
also of astute regulators and doctrinal sticklers. Considerations of pro-
portionality can lead to calls for higher penalties or stricter bribery
statutes in some cases. As of June 2008, Argentina, for example, was still
working to enact foreign bribery restrictions as to legal persons.2 6 Argen-
tina's proposed draft penal code amendments include corporate liability
and specify that fines for corporations should be set according to the
magnitude of the harm caused and the corporation's assets.2°' The
OECD's 2008 review of Argentina was concerned with the proportional-
ity of the proposed penal code reforms, noting that "basing the fines
principally on the harm actually caused may not sufficiently sanction
companies that offer large bribes. In some cases where substantial brib-
ery is discovered, there may not be much harm actually caused."'2 8
Proportionality is thus a normative value that supports fair practice in
creating criminal sanctions, and it is a concern-in either direction-
when a statute's application leads to criminal liability that is dispropor-
tionate either to the criminal's benefits from the criminal conduct or to
the magnitude of the criminal's wrongdoing-in this case measured by
the amount of the bribe. While disgorgement is supposed to be measured
by the illicit gain to the malfeasant, in the FCPA context, such a punish-
ment does not respect the general criminal punishment principle of
proportionality to the wrongdoing, which is the actual size of the bribe.
In other words, the size of the bribe, which is the measure of wrongdo-
ing, may end up correlating to the illicit gain, but it may not. This
disconnect may explain why the SEC settlement announcements often
describe the size of the bribe and the disgorgement from the violating
company without mentioning the benefit that the company actually re-
ceived from the bribe-perhaps because accurate calculation of such a
benefit would be impossible. '
204. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Making Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problems of
Finding an Optimal Criminal Sanction, I NORTH. ILL. L. REv. 1, 6-10 (1980).
205. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
206. OECD, Argentina: Phase 2 Report, supra note 110, at 47-49, 52.
207. Id. at 52.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Titan Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 19,107,
84 SEC Docket 3413 (Mar. 1, 2005); Sec. & Exch. Comrn'n v. ABB Ltd., SEC Litigation
Release No. 18,775, 83 SEC Docket 849 (July 6, 2004).
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This normative conclusion is advanced by the descriptive evidence
of proportionality that other States recognize and value in their ap-
proaches to combating foreign bribery and criminal sanctions more
generally. For example, in discussing disgorgement-like forfeiture, the
German criminal code addresses specific concerns of proportionality.
The law prohibits confiscation "disproportionate to the gravity of the
offence committed and to the culpability of the perpetrator ..... 0
Therefore, Germany discusses disgorgement in the same way as does the
SEC but focuses on the size of the bribe rather than the profit gained by
the firm.
The SEC's recent reliance on disgorgement in FCPA cases has failed
the proportionality test because there is no clear relationship between the
amount that a firm pays in a bribe, the provable gain from that bribe, and
the resulting disgorgement payment. 2 ' The SEC would likely respond
that the size of disgorgement should be based on the benefit to the firm.
And, indeed, it should. This is exactly why disgorgement is ill-suited for
foreign bribery. In the bribery context, the SEC often calls attention to
the size of the bribe paid but uses a theory of punishment that should be
based on the benefit received. The likely explanation for this behavior is
that the SEC cannot usually talk about the benefit received because,
unlike securities fraud cases, it is often undeterminable. In order for a
sentencing regime to properly respect utilitarianism and proportionality,
evidence in U.S. criminal law,12 foreign criminal law, and criminal
•211
theory in general, supports the claim that some kind of correlative rela-
tionship should exist between these variables. While the FCPA
disgorgement cases are basically all DPAs and NPAs, settlements are
210. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], § 74b, para. I (F.R.G.), translated in 3 FOR-
EIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER, supra note 36, at app. E-38, E-43. But, while the
Icelandic Penal Code requires consideration of "the damage caused by the offense" and the
"importance of the interests affected," there is no explicit proportionality requirement. Ice-
landic General Penal Code, Law. No. 19/1940, § 70 (Ice.). Concern that fines are
disproportionate to the harm of the size of the bribe are evident in a number of other States'
criminal statutes as well. See, e.g., Law No. 300, art. 11, Sept. 29, 2000, Gazz. Uff. No. 250,
Supp. Ord. 176/L (Oct. 25, 2000) (Italy), translated in 3 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
REPORTER, supra note 36, app. E-82, E-84-E-85 (stating that Italy's disgorgement-like confis-
cation authorizes confiscation of "the proceeds or the price of the offence, even by means of a
confiscation amounting to an equivalent value").
211. NEWCOMB & UROFSKY, supra note 69. The SEC could argue in response that the
size of the bribe is not as important as the benefits that the bribing firm receives. The response,
infra Part III.C.2, is that calculating the benefit that a firm received specifically as a result of a
bribe is often difficult-sometimes impossible-and typically involves an unacceptable level
of speculation.
212. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (describing the Eighth Amend-
ment's "narrow proportionality principle" as applied to individual sentencing).
213. See supra notes 206, 208-209 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
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informed by the background potential for liability, and the proportional-
ity concern is thus applicable.
2. Evidentiary Difficulties in Foreign Bribery Cases
Another reason to be hesitant about the use of disgorgement as the
leading theory of punishment in foreign bribery cases is the difficulty of
estimating profits that arise directly from a bribe. In describing a prob-
lem with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in 1998, Justice Stephen Breyer
alluded to the problem of "false precision," whereby the moral founda-
tion on which a sentencing regime rests can be undermined by attaching
specific numerical values to indefinite factors.25 While difficulty in cal-
culating penalties exists in many criminal sentencing regimes, and is
particularly prevalent in normative discussions regarding the SEC's
broad disgorgement power,26 these concerns are even more powerful
with respect to disgorgement in a foreign bribery context.
The FCPA is, indeed, not the only type of enforcement action for
which commentators have questioned disgorgement on the basis of how
the profits to be disgorged are calculated. Others have questioned the
SEC's use of disgorgement in the setting of disgorging executive com-
pensation under SOX, '7 as well as disgorgement as applied to a non-
profiting tipper in tipper-tippee insider trading cases.28 In their recent
article on the SEC's use of disgorgement against executives under SOX,
Elaine Buckberg and Frederick Dunbar argued that "in settled SEC en-
forcement actions, where parties disgorge funds as a result of a
negotiated settlement between the SEC and the party charged, the SEC
has often exceeded the limits of established jurisprudence and economic
reasoning in calculating the amount to be disgorged."2 9
It is also often difficult for a prosecutor to demonstrate-or a defen-
dant-corporation to refute if the burden is on the defense-the actual link
between an improper payment and specific profits that a firm generates
as a result of that payment.2 Unlike a typical SEC disgorgement case
related to securities trading, in which the SEC is able to base disgorge-
ment on the price of a security at two distinct points in time and set the
disgorgement on the unjust enrichment of that change in a securities
215. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Address at University of Nebraska
College of Law: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited (Nov. 18, 1998), reprinted in 11
FED. SENT'G REP. 180 (1999).
216. See Buckberg & Dunbar, supra note 87 (describing ways to solve the problem of
disgorgement calculation in executive pay cases).
217. Id. at 349.
218. See John K. Robinson, Note, A Reconsideration of the Disgorgement Remedy in
lipper-Tippee Insider Trading Cases, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 432 (1994).
219. Buckberg & Dunbar, supra note 87, at 349.
220. See, e.g., OECD, Argentina: Phase 2 Report, supra note 110, at 53.
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price between those two temporal points,22' there is no such clear metric
in calculating the part of a contract that was gained because of an im-
proper payment. Nor is it often even possible to know whether a
particular firm would have received a contract even without the bribe due
to the limited number of large, multinational firms that compete for
some of the contracts for which FCPA disgorgement has been assessed.
This Note is not original in observing the particular difficulty of
parsing profit earned from a foreign bribe from related profit that may
have been earned lawfully. Authorities in Finland have reported to the
OECD that one reason that confiscation of proceeds of a foreign bribe
have never been ordered in Finland is that "it is 'too difficult to assess
the surplus.' ''22  Such reasoning also lay behind Japan's resistance to pass
a statute allowing confiscation of the proceeds of bribery. 3
A final difficulty for corporations facing an SEC investigation is the
standard of review under which U.S. courts have often analyzed dis-
gorgement of profits.2 4 U.S. courts have typically held that the SEC is
entitled to disgorgement on a showing of a "reasonable approximation"
of a defendant's ill-gotten profit.25 Such a standard creates a consider-
able burden on a corporate defendant and increases the SEC's leverage
in any settlement negotiation, a particular problem because the SEC has
a tendency to exceed court-approved limits for disgorgement and has the
221. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n v. Wolfson, No. 06-4130, 2007 WL 2807741,
at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 25, 2007) (characterizing the SEC's disgorgement as "evidence submit-
ted" that showed "actual losses" based on defendant's participation in a stock price
manipulation scheme); Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n v. Maxxon, 465 F.3d 1174, 1178 n.8 (10th
Cir. 2006) (noting that disgorgement was based on a specific share price on a specific date);
Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31-32 (lst Cir. 2004) (characterizing as
proper a disgorgement calculation in an insider-trading case as the difference between the
value of defendant's stock when sold, which was after defendant learned of the company's
financial difficulties, and the value of the same number of shares on the day after a press re-
lease, approximately three weeks later, revealing the company's quarterly losses and leading
to the drop in stock price); Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n v. AbsoluteFuture.com, 393 F.3d 94,
96 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing disgorgement in the context of a specific amount of funds that
were illegally transferred).
222. OECD, Finland: Phase 2 Follow-Up Report, supra note 133, at 23.
223. But see OECD, Japan: Phase 2 Report, supra note 102, at 50-51 (noting that Japan
passed legislation in 2004 that did allow for confiscation).
224. This is in addition to the already large shadow that the Arthur Andersen prosecution
casts on any company seeking to negotiate fiercely against the SEC. See infra notes 232-234
and accompanying text.
225. See Coxon v. Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n, No. 03-73732, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
13186, at *2 (9th Cir. June 29, 2005); Sec. & Exch. Reg. Comm'n v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211,
1217 (1l th Cir. 2004).
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leverage of a criminal indictment if the prosecuted party does not set-
tle.226
D. The Need for Formal Instruments: Uncertainty Created
by Prosecutorial Discretion
The SEC's and the DOJ's current enforcement stance on the FCPA is
governed by the same agency policies that govern other prosecutions of
corporations, and normative questions about the role of prosecutorial
discretion in FCPA cases are related to those questions in other corporate
compliance settings. In an effort to create a predictable enforcement cli-
mate, the long-term efficacy of a DOJ or an SEC guideline is only as
good as a future administration's willingness to continue along the same
path as its predecessor. For example, over a period of only seven years,
the Holder, Thompson, and McNulty Memos defined and redefined con-
siderations to be taken into account when prosecuting corporations. 227 At
a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing in July 2008, Attorney General
Michael Mukasey surprised the Committee by revealing that the DOJ
was again considering "real significant proposed changes" to the
McNulty Memo. 28 Less than two months later, the Filip Memo changed
the DOJ's enforcement priorities. Such uncertainty, with questionable
regulatory and public interest benefits, can be undesirable and inefficient
for corporate strategy, whereas predictability allows corporate decision-
makers to better manage risk, making companies more competitive.
Further exacerbating this problem is the degree of discretion that the
DOJ and SEC guidelines can leave in the hands of U.S. attorneys. Nor-
mal hesitations with excessive prosecutorial discretion are frequently
overcome in securities contexts, for example, but may be uniquely
salient in the FCPA context.3  In the more general DOJ and SEC en-
forcement context, it was essentially one indictment, and the reputational
226. See infra notes 232-234 and accompanying text (describing the collapse of Arthur
Andersen and illustrating the leverage that the SEC and the DOJ hold in settlement negotia-
tions in the wake of that collapse).
227. See WSJ.com, Posting of Peter Lattman to LawBlog, http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2006/l 2/13/the-holder-memo/ (Dec. 13, 2006).
228. Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, AG Mukasey Hints at Revision of McNulty Memo, BLT:
BLOC OF LEGALTIMES, July 10, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1202422864034&rss=newswire.
229. See Filip Memo, supra note 75.
230. Similar concerns regarding regulatory predictability have led to calls for legislation
in areas in which DOJ guidelines have been seen as acquiring too much importance. See, e.g.,
White Collar Crime Prof Blog, Dec. 1, 2006, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
whitecollarcrimeblog/2006/12/attorneyclient_.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (suggesting
that legislation, not additional DOJ guidelines, was "the best way to proceed" in regards to
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in white-collar prosecutions).
231. See infra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
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damage associated with it, that caused the collapse of Arthur Andersen.2
Following the collapse of the $9 billion firm,"' there was broad-based
concern that, for many firms, a criminal indictment equaled a corporate
death sentence. These concerns and the resulting policy-making process
led to the Holder Memo and its effort to provide U.S. attorneys with
guidance as to how to deal with corporate criminal conduct.2'3 Two of the
concerns that the Holder Memo sought to address, and a current issue
with the disgorgement that the SEC is now seeking in FCPA prosecu-
tions, are the level at which individual prosecutors should be making
these discretionary decisions and which type of penalties and sanctions
incentivize and result in which kind of behavior.233
Such a generalized concern may not raise red flags sufficient to
question prosecutorial discretion in a securities context. However, con-
cerns about leverage in settlement negotiations and the power of an
individual prosecutor are particularly salient for the FCPA. This is be-
cause an FCPA indictment, alone, can also carry the legal consequences
of the immediate suspension of export licensing privileges for defense
items or the suspension of the ability to receive U.S. military procure-
ment contracts.236 For example, in the early 1990s, the Harris
Corporation was indicted for alleged payments to Colombian officials in
exchange for government contracts. It was immediately suspended from
receiving export licenses for defense products and from participating in
defense procurement contracts. The trial court, however, dismissed the
case at the close of the government's case, without even requiring the
Harris Corporation to mount a defense.2 37 Such consequences may not be
a component of disgorgement itself, but they may explain why firms
have not always aggressively disputed a type of punishment that does not
fit in the foreign bribery context.
While it may be too early to either legislate or establish more
agency-directed FCPA disgorgement guidelines, this is an issue to which
regulators, corporations, and corporate counsel should be attuned. As
described by Professor Roberta Karmel, the SEC frequently makes new
232. See Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Arthur Andersen and the Temple of Doom, 37 Sw. U. L. REV.
97, 104 (2008).
233. Id. at 99.
234. See Holder Memo, supra note 75.
235. This should not be confused with a claim that more central control is needed over
decisions to prosecute in individual cases, which runs the risk of more nefarious influence
from executive branch appointees motivated by partisan or political goals rather than by
achieving justice in an individual case. Rather, the claim is merely that general policy deci-
sions and a single set of theories on the structure of penalties increases regulatory
predictability for regulated parties.
236. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (1993); ZARIN, supra note 89, § 1-9.
237. ZARIN, supra note 89, § 1-1.
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law through actual enforcement cases rather than through rulemaking.235
While sometimes these efforts are blessed by the courts and Congress, in
other cases SEC enforcement actions develop what amounts to law,
which is then rejected by the other branches of government. 239 The SEC
has developed the "law" of disgorgement with neither the input, contem-
plation, nor blessing of Congress,240 and it is for this reason that one
should ask normative questions about the role of disgorgement in the
future enforcement of the prohibition on foreign bribery. As one com-
mentator has noted, "Consistency and predictability are not matters of
grace granted to corporate citizens at the government's pleasure; the
government owes consistency and predictability to public corporations
that are attempting to accomplish complex tasks in difficult foreign ven-
ues, and to management and directors who want to ... [comply] in these
circumstances."24 The OECD has likewise recommended that the United
States "[m]ake a clear public statement, in light of the OECD Conven-
tion, identifying the criteria applied in determining the priorities both of
the Department of Justice and of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in prosecuting FCPA cases. 242 This problem is not limited to the
United States, as other States that engage in foreign bribery prosecutions
similarly lack adequate guidelines to direct and inform prosecutorial dis-
cretion, 4' and commentators have pointed to the wide latitude that
foreign prosecutors may enjoy, particularly as to their decision whether
to prosecute a corporation.2
238. See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission:
The Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 33-35 (1998). In fact, a promi-
nent example of the SEC making new law through enforcement subsequently codified by
Congress is the SEC's sensitive payment enforcement cases, which led to the enactment of the
FCPA. Id. at 34.
239. Id.
240. See discussion supra Part II.A.
241. See Doty, supra note 84, at 1235.
242. OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., United States: Phase 2 Follow-Up
Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations on the Application of the
Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, at 12 (June 1, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/35/35109576.pdf [hereinafter OECD, United States: Phase 2
Follow-Up Report].
243. See, e.g., OECD, Directorate for Fin., Fiscal & Enter. Aff., Germany: Phase 2 Fol-
low-Up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 Recommendations on the Application of
the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, at 4, para. 6 (Dec. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/44/35927070.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Germany: Phase 2
Follow-Up Report] ("[German p]ublic prosecutors have not been provided with any specific
guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion for legal persons.").
244. See, e.g., OECD, Finland: Phase 2 Follow-Up Report, supra note 133, at 19;
OECD, Germany: Phase 2 Report, supra note 101, at 32 ("The German authorities state that a
decision of a prosecutor not to prosecute the legal person is not appealable.... [and i]t
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IV. CONCLUSION
Enforcement of the FCPA has reached an all-time high in recent
years. While many authorities have noted this trend, none have discussed
the fact that the most marked change in enforcement is the SEC's in-
creased interest in foreign bribery enforcement and its ability to obtain
increasingly large disgorgement through settlements. Although dis-
gorgement may be a theoretically justified form of punishment, on-the-
ground complications of multinational regulators, overlapping jurisdic-
tion, evidentiary difficulties in bribery cases, and a lack of
proportionality call into question the SEC's enforcement choice, particu-
larly in the absence of a clear statement that Congress contemplated such
significant disgorgement in its passage or amendment of the FCPA or
SOX. Relatively new foreign statutes passed pursuant to international
agreements also create significant opportunities for foreign regulators to
seek disgorgement. This international consensus belies the normative
pull of disgorging ill-gotten gains, but exacerbates the issues facing dis-
gorgement of profits in FCPA cases. The recent Siemens case
demonstrates that aggressive FCPA enforcement is not going away. Con-
gressional action is one potential solution for fixing the doctrinal
questions in FCPA enforcement; however, more formal and long-term
SEC statements addressing prosecutorial discretion as well as more spe-
cific, formal agreements with foreign regulators may provide the
necessary regulatory certainty without requiring such extensive political
coalescence.
appears that there are no specific guidelines for exercising prosecutorial discretion of legal
persons, including those for bribery offences."); OECD, Japan: Phase 2 Report, supra note
102, at 48-49.
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